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Despite rapid economic growth and assiduous efforts in anti-corruption campaigns, many 
Asian economies continue to be plagued with rampant corruption problems; and in a number 
of countries, the progress towards corruption reduction has stagnated over the last decade as 
measured by corruption perception indices. This paper focuses on the corporate sector as the 
main source of corruption problems in Asia, with particular emphasis on the impact that firm 
accounting practices have on the level of bribery. Using a unique cross-country firm-level 
dataset, we examine some distinct characteristics of bribery in corporate Asia, and empirically 
test the relationship between firm accounting practices and bribery. Our findings suggest that 
that better accounting practices can help reduce both the incidence of bribery activities and 
the amount of bribe payments, but conforming to high quality accounting standard alone will 
not necessary enhance the quality of accounting practices and thus will not automatically 
bring down the incidence of bribery.  
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Despite rapid economic growth, many Asian economies continue to be plagued with rampant 
corruption problems. According to the 2004 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) by 
Transparency International (Table 1), with only a few exceptions (Singapore and Hong Kong) 
most Asian countries are ranked as having a high level of corruption, and some of them 
ranked among the most corrupt countries in the World (Myanmar, Azerbaijan and Bangladesh 
in particular).  On a more startling note, in countries such as India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, and the Philippines, the progress towards corruption reduction has stagnated over 
the last decade despite of enormous resources directed to anti-corruption programs. 
 
Table 1 
Corruption in Asia: Corruption Perception Index 1995-2004 
 1995  2000  2004  
 Raw score Rank Raw score Rank Raw score Rank 
Azerbaijan   1.5 87 1.9 140 
Bangladesh     1.5 145 
China 2.2 40 3.1 63 3.4 71 
Hong Kong 7.1 11 7.7 15 8.0 16 
India 2.8 35 2.8 69 2.8 90 
Indonesia 1.9 41 1.7 85 2.0 133 
Japan 6.7 20 6.4 23 6.9 24 
Kazakhstan     2.2 122 
Malaysia 5.3 23 4.8 36 5.0 39 
Mongolia     3.0 85 
Myanmar     1.7 142 
Nepal     2.8 90 
Pakistan 2.3 39   2.1 129 
Papua New Guinea     2.6 102 
Philippines 2.8 36 2.8 69 2.6 102 
Singapore 9.3 3 9.1 6 9.3 5 
South Korea 4.3  4.0 48 4.5 47 
Sri Lanka     3.5 67 
Thailand 2.8 34 3.2 60 3.6 64 
Vietnam   2.5 76 2.6 102 
Data Source: Transparency International 
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The prevalence of corruption in Asia has attracted a great deal of attention in literature. Some 
scholars point to the emphasis of Asian culture on personal connections and collectivism to 
explain why Asian countries tend to be more corrupt than others. For example, Moon and 
Mclean (2003) blamed Confucian values for the ineffectiveness of anti-corruption efforts in 
Korea as “Confucian values override rationality, fairness and openness in public service”. 
Other scholars attribute rising corruption in the region to the democratization movement 
underway in many Asian countries, warning that money politics coupled with weak 
institutions could lead to more corruption during transitional period (Pye, 1997; Werlin, 2000). 
No matter how convincing these propositions are to account for the prevalence of corruption 
in Asia, however, they contribute very little towards the design of more effective anti-
corruption strategies for the region. The cultural change may take decades, generations and 
even centuries if it takes place at all; and rising corruption levels could be perceived as a 
reasonable price to pay for political development.  
Another main shortcoming in the literature is that the role of the corporate sector in the 
prevalence and persistence of corruption in Asia has for the most part been overlooked. 
Corporate Asia has several unique features that might pose potential challenges for effective 
anti-corruption campaigns. First of all, government-business relations in Asia are often 
governed by patron-client networks under which politically connected businesses can easily 
become vehicles for corrupted politicians to seize enormous economic rents (Wu, 2005b).  
Second, the majority of businesses in Asia are family businesses that are often more 
vulnerable to extortion of predatory officials because of their weak negotiation positions and 
less stringent information disclosure requirements. Third, low corporate governance standards 
in many Asian countries may greatly facilitate corrupt exchanges. For example, while 
accurate financial information reporting is essential to detect bribery and fraud, the tempering 
and doctoring of accounting reports have been widespread practices in Asian firms (Claessens 
and Fan, 2002)  
Wu, X., 2005. Firm Accounting Practices, Accounting Reforms and Corruption in Asia. Policy 




Ignoring the role of the corporate sector in corruption may have severely limited the 
effectiveness of any anti-corruption campaign. While corrupt politicians and government 
officials are the bribe-takers, it is often the private sector (especially the corporate sector) that 
offers the bribes (Vogl, 1998; Wu, 2005a). The corporate sector is both the victim and 
perpetrator of corruption: while businesses are often subject to extortion from corrupt 
government officials, it is not uncommon to find that businesses themselves initiate the 
bribery deal in order to evade their responsibilities to the public or to undermine the efforts of 
their competitors.  
This article focuses on firm accounting practices as a potential contributing factor of 
corruption in Asia. Corruption, regardless of which form it takes, usually involves a financial 
payment, inevitably leaving a paper trail behind in accounting record. Accountants and 
auditors are thus in a unique position to detect and prevent corrupt acts. In Asia, however, the 
accounting practices in many firms are often of low quality. On one hand, firms may find it 
convenient to have murky accounting practices because they can easily tamper with their 
accounting books to evade extortion or to shield them from unfair discrimination by the 
government. On the other hand, bad accounting practices also make it difficult to detect and 
prevent other business flaws that are detrimental to the firms.  
The 1997-98 Asian financial crisis has decidedly changed firms’ calculation of the benefits 
and costs of establishing better quality financial reporting systems. The low standard of 
accounting practices has been recognized as a major factor contributing to the crisis (Rahman, 
1998; Johnson et al, 2000; Mitton, 2002), and many Asian governments have launched 
various accounting reforms to enhance the quality and disclosure of accounting information in 
order to restore the investor confidence (ADB, 2001). Typical reform initiatives implemented 
in the region include the adoption of International accounting standards (IAS) and the 
strengthening of the role of external auditors.  
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The main objective of our paper is to examine the importance of accounting practices in 
reducing bribery, as well as the effectiveness of accounting reform as an anti-corruption 
strategy. Using a unique cross-country firm-level dataset, we examine some distinct 
characteristics of bribery in corporate Asia, and empirically test the relationship between firm 
accounting practices and the level of bribery. Our findings suggest that that better accounting 
practices can help reduce both the incidence of bribery activities and the amount of bribe 
payments, but merely conforming to high quality accounting standard alone will not 
necessary enhance the quality of accounting practices and thus will not automatically bring 
down the incidence of bribery.  
In the next section, we will provide an account of prevalent bribery practices in corporate 
Asia by using the dataset from the World Business Environment Survey. Following that, we 
propose a theoretical link between the firms’ accounting practices and the incidence of 
bribery.  Then, we will present our empirical findings on the effect of accounting practices on 
corruption, based on multivariate analysis. Finally, we will conclude our analysis by 
discussing some policy implications of our findings.  
 
Bribery Activities in Corporate Asia 
While it is widely believed that bribery is widespread among Asian firms, few studies provide 
systematic evidence of actual bribery activities across Asian countries.  Most existing studies 
focus on the demand side of the corruption, that is, on the corrupt officials who receive bribes, 
while the role of the corporate sector in providing the payoffs is largely ignored. As a result, 
many critical questions regarding the extent and nature of bribery activities in corporate Asia 
remain unanswered.  For instance, to what extent do Asian firms engage in bribery? How 
much in bribes do Asian firms pay? Do firms normally know the amount of bribery in 
advance? Would the corrupt officials deliver their services after receiving the bribery 
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payments? Do firms have other options without reverting to bribery? What are the differences 
across countries and across firms within each country?  
The World Business Environment Survey (WBES) provides a unique dataset that is suitable 
for comparative analysis of bribery activities in Asia. The survey was conducted in 1999-
2000 by the World Bank with the aim to understand the constraints facing businesses, and it 
covers 83 countries, including 12 Asian countries. The coverage of the survey in Asia and the 
number of firms in each country are reported in Table 2. The survey is unique because it 
contains several questions directly related to the corruption and bribery in firms. For example, 
one question asks firms how often they have to pay “additional payment” to public officials to 
get things done1, and another question elicits the amount of bribe paid as a percentage of the 
firms’ revenues2.   
 
Table 2 
Coverage of World Business Environment Survey in Asia 














                                                 
1 Firms were asked: “How often do firms in my line of business have to pay some irregular ‘additional payments’ 
for government officials to get things done?” The responses were tabulated across a range - Always, Usually, 
Frequently, Sometimes, Seldom and Never. 
2 Firms were asked: “What percentage of revenues do firms like yours pay per annum in unofficial payments to 
public officials?” The responses ranged across percentage - 0%, less than 1%, 1 to 2%, 2-10%, 10 to 12%, 12 to 
25%, and over 25%. 
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Table 3 presents an overall assessment of the bribery practices in Asian firms. Fifty-four 
percent of Asian firms  regularly pay bribes to public officials, and only 17% of firms have 
never paid any bribe. The results unquestionably reveal the highly institutionalized bribery 
practices in many Asian countries: firms generally know in advance the amount of bribe 
payments that have to be made, and the bribe takers do deliver their services once the bribe 
payments are received. It is equally revealing to find that many firms have the option of not 
paying bribes. While the bribe-extracting officials are highly predatory, as about half of the 
firms report that bribery payment may lead to additional requests for bribe payments, over 
fifty percent of the firms do have the option of not paying the bribes. It is clear that the 
corporate sector is not just a ‘victim’ of corruption, and many firms are in fact active and 
willing parties to corrupt transactions.  
Table 3 
Bribery Activities in Asian Firms 
 
 Frequently Sometimes Seldom Never 
Do firms have to pay some irregular 
"additional payments" to government 
officials to get things done? 
54% 19% 10% 17% 
Do firms know in advance about how much 
this "additional payment" is? 
57% 22% 12% 9% 
Is the service delivered as agreed If the firm 
pays the required "additional payment"? 
77% 13% 5% 5% 
Would another government officials 
subsequently require an additional payment 
for the same service if firm pays the required 
additional payment to a particular 
government official? 
47% 21% 11% 20% 
Can the firms go to another officials to get 
the correct treatment without recourse to 
unofficial payments if a government agent 
acts against the rules? 
29% 24% 22% 25% 
Data source: WBES (2000) and author’s calculation. 
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Considerable variations in the levels of bribery are found among different Asian countries. 
Table 4 shows the frequency of the bribery payments by firms in different countries. In 
Bangladesh, where bribery is the most prevalent among all countries in the sample, 96% of 
firms reported that they regularly bribe public officials. In Singapore, only 2% of firms are 
found to offer bribes regularly and 90% of firms never pay any at all. It is interesting to note 
that the rank of a country in the Corruption Perception Index roughly corresponds to the 
frequency of the bribery payments—not only suggesting that the findings are robust, but also 
confirming that the corporate sector is indeed the main contributor of the rampant corruption 
problems in Asia.  
Table 4 
Incidence and Amount of Bribery across Asian Countries 











Azerbaijan 59% 9% 14% 17% 20% 47% 26% 7%
Bangladesh 94% 4% 2% 0% 32% 48% 19% 0%
Cambodia 44% 27% 14% 15% 27% 50% 18% 5%
India 55% 28% 6% 11%   
Indonesia 68% 23% 3% 6% 28% 45% 23% 4%
Kazakhstan 24% 35% 13% 28% 45% 35% 17% 3%
Malaysia 20% 27% 7% 45% 32% 42% 26% 0%
Pakistan 70% 17% 9% 4% 21% 48% 29% 3%
Philippines 43% 27% 17% 13% 44% 44% 13% 0%
Singapore 2% 1% 7% 90%   
Thailand 79% 10% 8% 4% 29% 48% 21% 2%
Total 54% 19% 10% 17%   
Data source: WBES (2000) and author’s calculation. 
The amount of bribes made by firms that report graft activities also differ considerably in 
different countries (Table 4). In Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Pakistan and Malaysia, more than a 
quarter of the firms that engage in bribery pay out at least 10% of their sales as bribes. It is of 
interest to observers that the amount of bribes made  might not be correlated closely with the 
incidence of bribery across countries. For example, the incidence rate of bribery reported by 
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Malaysian firms is quite low, but a significant portion of firms that are involved in bribery 
make sizeable payouts. In Bangladesh however, although 98% of firms report some levels of 
bribery activities, the majority of the firms make small payouts. This suggests that anti-
corruption programs may, in fact, result in an increase in the amount of each bribe payout as a 
higher reward is needed to justify the increased risk of being caught (Rose-Ackerman, 2002). 
In summary, the corporate sector is an important source of prevalent corruption problems in 
Asia. Based on WBES results, the majority of Asian firms have been involved in bribery 
activities although there are significant variations across countries. Firms pay a significant 
portion of their sales as bribes, and bribe payments often lead to more extortion from 
predatory officials.  
Although corporate Asia is a major contributing factor of corruption, the potential of 
containing corruption through the reduction of bribery practices in the corporate sector has 
not been explored fully. Highly institutionalized bribery practices in Asia suggest that the 
mechanisms of detecting and preventing bribery activities in the corporate sector are quite 
weak, and that significant progress can be made by targeting this weak link in the battle 
against corruption.  
Linking Firm Accounting Practices with Corruption 
On the surface bribery may appear to be cost-effective for the firms because bribe payment is 
often a fraction of the services provided by the bribe takers, and it might be especially true for 
Asian firms as the bribe takers are reportedly able to honor their promises. However, the 
seemingly justifiable bribery practices have several hidden costs for the firms in the long run. 
Participating in bribery activities could expose firms to substantial legal and financial risks in 
the future, and open the door for more extortions as we see in last section. Bribery also 
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undermines the firms’ strategies in developing long-tern competitive advantage if they  
continue to rely on bribe payments to win businesses (Wu, 2005a).  
Why do so many firms engage in bribery activities if it is not in their best interest to be 
involved in such activities? The principal-agent problems often arise in modern corporations 
where the ownership and management are separated as the interests of the managers (the 
agents) may not coincide with that of the owners (the principals). As a result, the managers 
might pursue their own interests at the expense of the owners and other stakeholders of the 
firms. For example, securing a public project by bribing public officials may increase the 
compensation for the managers, but the firm could be held criminally liable for such action, 
and the owners and other stakeholders are forced to take the blame for the managers’ actions.  
The multiple layers in corporate structure can also be an obstacle to effective internal control 
of a company.  Even if the top management is committed to ethical business conduct, lower-
level managers or employees may engage in corrupt practices to increase their short-term 
personal gains. For example, many multi-national companies have established subsidiary 
companies to penetrate markets in developing countries, and there have been several high 
profile bribery cases involving these subsidiaries in recent years (e.g., Xerox in India and 
IBM in Argentina).  
Firm accounting practices are essential in preventing and detecting bribery. Bribery often 
involves financial payment in one form or another, and it inevitably leaves behind a paper 
trail. Accounting is an information system that reports financial transaction and auditing 
serves as the monitoring and internal control mechanism—together they form a critical line of 
defense against corrupt practices.  Accounting and auditing are also essential in detecting 
bribery activities. Unusual and excessive expenditure may immediately raise the red flag on 
the possibility of bribery, and a departure from the routine handling of financial transactions 
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could also catch the attention of well-trained accountants. It is thus no surprise that 
accountants are often closer than other professional in detecting corrupt acts (Kimbro, 2003). 
On the other hand, poor financial information reporting systems can greatly undermine the 
firms’ ability to detect and prevent bribery activities. Those who deal with a firm’s business 
operations may hold certain advantages over others with regard to the information on business 
transactions, which enable them to exploit the weaknesses of the accounting system. For 
example, if the accounting rules on depreciation rates and equipment upgrading are not well 
established or implemented, bribe payouts can be easily disguised as high equipment 
depreciation costs while a claimed equipment upgrading never takes place.     
More formally, the effects of firm accounting practices on bribery can be outlined as follows. 
First of all, better accounting practices can reduce bribery by solving the problem of 
information asymmetry inherent in modern corporations. The information asymmetry 
problem originates from the fact that agents often have some advantage over principals in 
their access to information, as they are closer to business operations. Clear accounting rules 
and implementation guidelines level the playing field between the agents and principals over 
information, enabling the latter to more effectively monitor and assess the behaviors of the 
agents.  
High quality accounting practices can also help to deter bribery activities from the demand 
side because the bribe-extracting official would face greater risks of being caught if firms’ 
have good accounting systems. By committing to better accounting practices, a firm is also 
sending a strong signal to other firms that that it is determined to close door to bribery 
practices, limiting the chances for predatory officials to play the firms against each other in 
eliciting bribes.  
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Last, better accounting practices can help prevent high level or “grand corruption” for which 
bribes are paid in exchange for favored treatment on contracts, concessions and privatization 
deals, because it would make it almost impossible to hide the huge payments under a well-run 
accounting system. While greatly outnumbered by “petty corruption”, which is widespread in 
many developing countries, “grand corruption” often has far more destructive impact on a 
country’s economic and political system (Rose-Ackerman, 2002).  
 
Empirical Findings 
1. Firm Accounting Practices in Asia 
Maintaining high quality financial information reporting is strenuous on both time and 
resources, involving long term high costs and the deployment of highly educated human 
capital such as accountants and lawyers (Bushman and Smith, 2001). Many firms in 
developing countries in Asia may be reluctant to make the resource commitment needed to 
maintain high quality financial information reporting. Firms also lack proper incentives to 
improve the quality of financial information reporting, because murky accounting practices 
make it easier to tamper with accounting information to evade tax obligations, a common 
practice among Asian firms. In addition, the manipulation of accounting information is not 
only tolerated, but also implicitly encouraged by predatory governmental officials because it 
leaves the door wide open for extortion.  
Over the last decade, however, the value of high quality accounting practices has been 
gaining recognition in many Asian countries. First of all, as companies face increasingly 
competitive environments, the access to capital becomes essential for firms’ survival and 
growth. If firms have low quality financial information reporting, they could face high hurdles 
in securing the capital resources they need. Secondly, as globalization deepens, the expansion 
of international trade makes it increasingly necessary to have a common set of accounting 
standards that will provide a level playing field for all companies worldwide. The 
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International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) has been actively promoting the use 
of a single set of accounting standards that will ultimately be acceptable to all countries as the 
basis for cross-border financial transactions (Bushman and Smith, 2001). Finally, the rapid 
economic growth in many Asian countries has enabled these countries to focus on the 
development of human resources necessary for strengthening financial reporting. For example, 
business education in Asia has experienced significant growth over the last twenty years and 
tens of thousands business professionals graduate with MBA degrees annually.  
The single most important event that altered Asian firms’ perception of the importance of 
accounting practices is the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis. It is widely believed now that 
inadequate financial disclosure was a leading cause of the crisis. Choi (2001) argues that the 
noncompliance of financial statements with International standards, the firms’ disclosure 
deficiencies and the lack of rigorous monitoring by external auditors are among the leading 
causes for the financial crisis in Korea. Rahman (1998) conducted a comparative study of five 
East Asian countries affected by the crisis and he found most of the companies in these 
countries did no follow International Accounting Standards (IAS).  
In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, many Asian countries have undertaken 
accounting reforms to strengthen the quality of financial reporting. Countries that have largely 
escaped the crisis, such as China, have also realized the financial risks associated with poor 
accounting practices (Lin and Chen, 2000). Typical reform measures in Asian countries 
involve the adoption of International accounting standards and independence in audit. Table 5 
shows that the effects of these reform initiatives at the firm level have been quite impressive: 
roughly fifty percent of the firms in the WBES sample now use International accounting 
standards and about 60% of firms hire external auditors to review their annual financial 
statements.  
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Accounting Standards and Their Implementations across Asian Countries 
 Accounting Standards Accounting Practices  




Percent of firms have 
annual financial 
statements that have been 




100% of their 
sales for tax 
purpose 
Percent of firms 
report 50-99% 
of their sales for 
tax purpose 
Percent of firms 
report les than 
50% of their sales 
for tax purpose 
Azerbaijan 18% 8% 29% 53% 18%
Bangladesh 76% 95% 15% 69% 15%
Cambodia 27% 22% 24% 35% 41%
China 12% 43% 14% 34% 52%
India 75% 97% 54% 44% 2%
Indonesia 45% 52% 32% 51% 17%
Kazakhstan 63% 37% 54% 39% 7%
Malaysia 20% 47% 26% 40% 34%
Pakistan 64% 52% 28% 49% 24%
Philippines 31% 81% 46% 41% 13%
Singapore 68% 95% 88% 7% 6%
Thailand 62% 83% 21% 61% 18%
Total 48% 58% 34% 45% 21%
Data source: WBES (2000) and author’s calculation. 
The adoption of the rules and regulations in accounting reforms, however, should not be 
interpreted as equal to having good accounting practices. Accounting scandals in US, such as 
Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco, suggest that accounting flaws occur even in developed 
countries with good accounting rules and highly competent professionals. Accounting 
standards are only as good as the enforcement mechanisms driving them, and the external 
auditors may align their interests with corrupt corporate boards and managers by turning a 
blind eye on irregularities in accounting reports. Choi (2001) argues that change in accounting 
practices may take a long time to be fully implemented, although it is relatively quick to 
introduce the change. Rosser (2003) observes that, while the adoption of IAS in Indonesian 
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firms may create a positive image for foreign investors that they are doing something to 
improve the quality of financial information reporting, little has changed in actuality.    
The difficulties of carrying out accounting reforms are confirmed by our empirical results. 
Table 5 indicates that there is a sizable disparity between the accounting standards and their 
actual implementation. While 50% of firms use International accounting standards and 60% 
hire external auditors to auditor annual financial reports, only 34% of firms would report 
100% of their sales for accounting purposes. This disparity is especially startling for firms in 
South Asia. For example, in Bangladesh, while 76% of firms use International accounting 
standards and 95% of firms have their annual financial statements audited by external auditors, 
only 15% report 100% of their sales and more than half of the firms only report less than 50% 
of their sales for tax purposes. It is clear that conforming to new accounting standards alone 
would not guarantee good accounting practices.  
On the other hand, while comparisons between standards and implementation indicate the 
inadequacy of reforms in changing accounting practices, there is no denying of some 
improvements made by the accounting reforms in Asian firms. Table 6 shows the correlation 
between the accounting rules, such as in the adoption of IAS and the use of external auditors, 
and firms’ actual accounting practices. Overall, the accounting practices are marginally better 
for the firms that have adopted the IAS and the same can be said about the use of external 
auditors.  
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Effect of Accounting Standards on Accounting Practices 
 
 Percent of 
firms report 
100% of their 
sales for tax 
purpose 
Percent of firms 
report 50-99% 
of their sales for 
tax purpose 
Percent of firms 
report les than 
50% of their 
sales for tax 
purpose 
Firms that do not use international 
accounting standards (IAS) 
26% 46% 28% 
Firms that use international 
accounting standards (IAS) 
43% 43% 14% 
  
Firms that don't provide their 
shareholders with annual financial 
statements that have been 
reviewed by an external auditor 
25% 44% 32% 
Firms that provide their 
shareholders with annual financial 
statements that have been 
reviewed by an external auditor 
43% 43% 13% 
Data source: WBES (2000) and author’s calculation. 
In the remainder of this section, we examine the relationship between firm accounting 
practices and bribery by using the three measures of accounting practices – the adoption of 
IAS, the use of external auditors and the percentage of sales reported for tax purpose. 
 
2. Econometric Models 
Two econometric models – the probit model and the interval regression model – are used to 
test the hypotheses regarding the relationship between firm accounting practices and bribery. 
The probit model focuses on the firms’ decisions to engage in or refrain from bribery in their 
business operations, while the interval regression model focuses on the determinants of the 
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size of the bribery payments. Together, these econometric models provide empirical evidence 
of the relationship between firm accounting practices on bribery activities.  
While the main variables of interest are the incidence of bribery and the firms’ accounting 
practices, other variables are included in the models to control for alternative interpretations 
of bribery activities at the firm level. In particular, we assume that the bribe (bij) that firm i in 
country j pays (as a share of revenue) is a function of the firm’s characteristics (xij), the 
characteristics of bribery (yij), the characteristics of firm-specific external environment (zij), 
country level characteristics (cj) and a normally distributed unobserved error term ( ijε ): 
 ijjijijijij czyxb εββββα +++++= 4321  
Besides the three variables measuring firm accounting practices, firm characteristics such as 
firm size and ownership type are included. Small firms may be easy targets for predatory 
governmental officials because of their lack of power to resist monetary demands, at the same 
time they can avoid detection by government authorities more easily (Svensson, 2003). The 
type of ownership may also affect the firms’ propensity for bribery. Private ownership may be 
positively correlated with incidence of bribery because private firms tend to have higher 
profits while managers of public enterprises might be more able to resist bribe demands 
(Clarke and Xu, 2004). 
The nature of bribery is measured by three variables: BRIBEPRED, BRIBEDELIV, and 
BRIBEALTER. The first variable, BRIBEPRED, measures the extent to which the amount of 
payment is known in advance, indicating the level of institutionalization of bribery practices. 
Firms are more likely to pay bribes in an environment where there is less uncertainty 
regarding bribery (Herrera and Rodriguez, 2003). The second variable, BRIBEDELIV, 
measures the extent to which the briber takes would deliver their services after the bribe 
payments are made. Firms are more likely to pay bribes if they are assured that the bribe-
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takers would deliver on their promises. The last variable, BRIBEALTER, measures whether 
or not the firms have the options of not paying bribes. Firms are less likely to pay bribes if 
they have viable alternatives to bribery.  
The firms’ operating environment can also play a significant role in determining the extent of 
the graft activities it engages in. Here we examine four dimensions: the quality of the legal 
system (JUDICIAL), licensing requirements (LICENSING), taxation (TAXATION), and the 
level of competition (COMPETITION). JUDICIAL is the level of confidence a firm has in 
the ability of the legal system to uphold contract and property rights in business disputes. 
Bribery would be more prevalent in countries where firms have low confidence in its judicial 
system because the corrupt exchange is unlikely to be punished even if it is exposed.  
LICENSING and TAXATION, on the other hand, measure the discretionary power 
government officials have over the businesses; LICENSING is the extent to which business 
licensing is problematic and TAXATION is  the firm’s perception of the extent to which tax 
regulation/administration is problematic. We expect that the more discretionary power 
officials have in licensing and taxation, the higher the incidence of bribery activities. The 
final component is the number of competitors (COMPETITION) the firm has. When there are 
more competitors, firms become concerned that there will be more incidences of bribing to 
gain business advantage. They may also increase bribe amounts as part of a bidding war to 
elicit more services from corrupt officials.  
Firms are more likely to engage in bribery activities in a country where the overall corruption 
level is higher because the moral cost of bribery is low or the likelihood of being caught is 
minimal (Clarke and Xu, 2004). To control of the effect of the overall level of corruption on 
firm’s propensity for bribery, we include the corruption perception indices by Transparency 
International in the model. This is a country-specific variable because all firms in a particular 
country would face the same overall level of corruption.  
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The dependent variable for the probit model is Iij , a dummy variable indicating whether or 
not firm i in country j is involved in bribery activities. Iij takes 1 if the firm has engaged in 
bribery, and Iij equals to 0 if the firm has never been involved in bribery. The likelihood 
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where φ is the standard normal distribution.  
The dependent variable for the interval regression model is taken from responses to the 
question on the amount of bribes as a percentage of the firm’s revenue. Only firms responding 
with non-zero percentage are included in the estimation, and six brackets are constructed, 
corresponding to firms reporting less than 1%, 1 to 2%, 2-10%, 10 to 12%, 12 to 25%, over 
25%.  They are, respectively, (0, 0.01), (0.01, 0.02), (0.02,0.1), (0.1, 0.12), (0.12, 0.25), (0.25, 
1.00). The two numbers in the each bracket indicate the lower ( ) and upper bound 
( ) of the bribery payment made by the firm. The likelihood function for the Interval 


























A description of the variables for the models is shown in Table 7. All data are from WBES, 
except for the Corruption Perception Index (CORRUPTION) at the country level, which is 
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Description of Variables 
SMALL Dummy variable. 1=Small size firm; 0=all others 
MEDIUM Dummy variable. 1=Medium size firm; 0=all others 
PRIVATE Dummy variable. 1=Corporation privately held; 0=all others 
IAS Dummy variable. 1=firm adopts international accounting 
standards; 0=all others 
AUDIT Dummy variable. 1=Annual financial statements reviewed by 
external auditor; 0=all others 
UNREPORT The percentage of the sales firms “keep off the books.” Scale from 
1 to 7 (1=0%; 2=1-10%; 3=11-20%; 4=21-30%; 5=31-40%; 6=41-
50%; 7=more than 50% 
BRIBEPRED The extent to which the amount of bribery payment is known in 
advance. Scale from 1 to 6 (1=never; 2=seldom; 3=sometimes; 
4=frequently; 5=mostly; 6=always) 
BRIBEDELIV The extent to which the service for bribery payment is delivered 
after the payment is made. Scale from 1 to 6 (1=never; 2=seldom; 
3=sometimes; 4=frequently; 5=mostly; 6=always) 
BRIBEALTER The extent to which the firm has option of going to different 
officials to correct the treatment without reversing to bribery. 
Scale from 1 to 6 (1=never; 2=seldom; 3=sometimes; 
4=frequently; 5=mostly; 6=always) 
JUDICIAL Level of confidence on the legal system to uphold contact and 
property rights in business disputes (1=very confident; 
2=confident in most cases; 3=somewhat confident; 4=somewhat 
unconfident; 5=unconfident in most cases; 6=very unconfident) 
LICENSING The extent to which business licensing is problematic. Scale from 
1 to 4 (1=no obstacle; 2=minor obstacle; 3=moderate obstacle; 
4=major obstacle) 
TAXATION The extent to which tax regulations/administration are 
problematic. Scale from 1 to 4 (1=no obstacle; 2=minor obstacle; 
3=moderate obstacle; 4=major obstacle) 
CORRUPTION Corruption Perception Index 2000 (Transparency International) 




The results of the two models are presented in Table 8. Column (1) and (2) report the 
coefficients and standard errors of the estimation of Probit Model while Column (3) and (4) 
show the results of the Interval Regression Model. The main difference between Column (1) 
and (2) is the measurement for firm accounting practices in the model: the adoption of IAS 
and use of external auditors are used in the first model while the percentage of sales reported 
for tax purpose is used in the second model, and the same can be said about the difference 
between Column (3) and (4).   
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Probit Model Interval Regression  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
SMALL 0.026 0.025 0.011 0.012 
 (0.245) (0.240) (0.009) (0.008) 
MEDIUM 0.033 -0.066 0.005 0.003 
 (0.237) (0.237) (0.008) (0.008) 
PRIVATE -0.288 -0.394** 0.002 0.000 
 (0.196) (0.188) (0.007) (0.007) 
IAS -0.075  -0.001  
 (0.198)  (0.007)  
AUDIT -0.073  -0.006  
 (0.226)  (0.007)  
UNREPORTED  0.076**  0.002** 
  (0.032)  (0.001) 
BRIBEPRED 0.131** 0.077 0.008*** 0.006*** 
 (0.065) (0.066) (0.002) (0.002) 
BRIBEDELIV 0.207*** 0.252*** 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.074) (0.075) (0.003) (0.003) 
BRIBEALTER -0.019 -0.031 -0.006*** -0.005*** 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.002) (0.002) 
JUDICIAL -0.176** -0.162** -0.008*** -0.009*** 
 (0.082) (0.080) (0.002) (0.002) 
LICENSING -0.056 -0.084 0.002 0.003 
 (0.095) (0.095) (0.003) (0.003) 
TAXATION 0.155** 0.226** 0.005 0.005* 
 (0.093) (0.094) (0.003) (0.003) 
CORRUPTION 0.219*** 0.213*** 0.004 0.005* 
 (0.069) (0.064) (0.003) (0.003) 
COMPETITION 0.342** 0.298** -0.005 -0.004 
 (0.148) (0.143) (0.005) (0.005) 
CONSTANT -1.678** -1.967*** 0.021 0.015 
 (0.732) (0.735) (0.031) (0.028) 
Number of 
Observations 574 617 416 441 
Pseudo-R2 0.293 0.307 - - 
 
Note: The table reports unstandardized coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Most control variables in the two models are generally consistent with the prior predictions as 
well as findings of other empirical studies, although statistical significance levels vary 
depending on model specifications. 
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Variables on firm characteristics have limited explanatory power on the incidence and amount 
of bribery. The coefficients on SMALL shows that small firms are more likely to engage in 
bribery and they pay more in bribes, but both effects are not statistically significant. Contrary 
to findings by Clarke and Xu (2004) and Svensson (2003), private firms in Asia are not more 
prone to bribery activities than their public counterpart, indicating that bribery is also 
widespread practice among public-owned firms in Asia.  
The level of institutionalization for bribery activities has statistically significant effect on both 
the incidence and amount of bribery. The more predictable the amount of bribery payment, 
the more likely the bribery activities and the higher the bribery payments. The extent to which 
the bribe-takers can deliver their services has statistically significant effects on the incidence 
of bribery, but its effects on the amount of bribery payments are not statistically significant. 
The coefficients and error terms on BRIBEALTER suggest that, while firms with options to 
abstain from bribery tend to pay less in bribery payments because they have stronger 
negotiation power in dealing with bribe-takers, such effects on the incidence of bribery is not 
statistically significant.  
The results also show that firms’ operating environments play an important role in 
determining both the incidence and amount of bribery. Both the incidence and amount of 
bribery decrease as the firm has more confidence in the judicial system. TAXATION seems 
to be a bigger concern for Asian firms in comparison to licensing requirements. Firms that 
report resentment for tax regulations and administration (TAXATION) are more likely to 
engage in bribery, while those who report dissatisfaction over licensing requirements 
(LICENSING) do not have statistically significant effects. In addition, more competition does 
make firms more likely to pay bribes, although its effect on the amount of bribery is not 
statistically significant. Finally, the overall level of corruption is indeed important in shaping 
firms’ behaviors with regard to bribery. Firms in a country where the overall corruption level 
is higher are more likely to get involved in bribery. Firms are caught in a catch-22 situation 
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high level of corruption forces firms to engage in bribery, but by doing so firms also directly 
contribute to the increase the overall corruption level in the country. This vicious cycle of 
bribery and corruption makes it difficult to eradicate corruption at the firm level.  
While the effects of the first two measures of firm accounting practices—adoption of IAS and 
use of external auditors – have expected effects on both the incidence and amount of bribery, 
these effects are not statistically significant, results of Column (2) and (4) show that firm 
accounting practices measured by the percentage of sales reported does have expected effects 
on bribery activities and it is statistically significant.  The prevention of accounting 
irregularities such as keeping sales off the books can play a positive role in the battle against 
corruption from the perspective of the corporate sector. Our findings indicate that both the 
potential and limitation of the accounting reforms that emphasize the adoption of IAS and the 
role of the external auditors. While a reduction in the irregularities in firm accounting 
practices can play an important role in reducing corruption, a mere promulgation of the 
accounting rules and regulations would not be enough the revert the trend.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
The economic growth experienced by many Asian countries has been extraordinary by any 
yardstick. China’s GDP has quadrupled over the past two decades and India’s economic 
growth has surged since 1980. Asia’s impressive economic progress, however, is 
overshadowed by rampant corruption. Measured by the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) by 
Transparency International, the progress towards corruption reduction in a number of Asian 
countries has stagnated despite enormous resources directed to anti-corruption programs. 
A major shortcoming of many anti-corruption programs is that the supply side of the 
corruption problems has not been given its due attention.  Corruption has both the demand 
and supply aspects to it, and the actions of bribe-payers (supply side) are as important as those 
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of bribe-takers (demand side) in determining the level of corruption. Our empirical analysis 
clearly shows that the corporate sector, often portrayed as the victim of corruption, is an 
important source of rampant corruption problems in Asia.  A majority of firms have engaged 
in bribery activities in most countries, and in some countries, almost all firms are involved in 
one way or another. The corrupt practices are highly institutionalized as there is little 
uncertainty on the amount of bribes as well as on the delivery of the services in exchange for 
bribe payments. It is also clear that the corporate bribe-payers are not as innocent as they are 
made out to be, and many firms are active and willing parties to corrupt transactions.  
Our empirical analysis also shows that better accounting practices can help reduce both the 
incidence of bribery activities and the amount of bribe payments, thereby crippling corruption 
practices at the source.  Better accounting practices can reduce bribery by: 1) solving the 
problem of information asymmetry inherent in modern corporations; 2) imposing greater risk 
of being caught for bribe-extracting officials; 3) curbing “grand corruption” in contracting, 
concessions, and privatization deals.  
Public policies targeting improved firm accounting practices could be effective anti-
corruption strategies. Such efforts are likely to be sustained because it is self-motivated and 
self-driven from the perspective of firms. Firms can potentially receive triple dividends from 
improvements in accounting practices. Better accounting practices can protect firms from the 
costs of business flaws associated with murky financial information reporting, provide firms 
with better prospects of growth, and eliminate expenses in bribe payments.  
Our empirical analysis also points to the potential and limitation of accounting reform as an 
anti-corruption strategy. While accounting reform measures, such as the adoption of IAS and 
the use of external auditors, have made some improvements on firm accounting practices, 
their enforcement is far from comprehensive, and conforming to high quality accounting 
standard alone will not automatically bring down incidence of bribery.  
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